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BUILDING UP A  NATIONAL IDENTITY: THE CASE OF BULGARIA
Roumen Daskalov
The national identity is a kind of “portrait” (or “image”) the ethnic 
group creates and sustains about itself: notions about what it is, how 
it differs from other nations, how it came to be what it presently is, 
etc.1 The national “consciousness”, that is the sense of belonging to a 
national group, is propped on such notions and upon the sentiments 
invested in them. It is my purpose in this paper to present some 
notions of the Bulgarian national identity and to reflect upon their 
functioning. The particular case that I am considering here is a case 
of the virtually universal phenomenon of identity building and is thus 
of wider relevance.
Some qualifications are needed. The nation can mean different things 
according to social group, period and geographic area. There is thus 
not just one but a variety of national identities, that is, a variety of 
ways of experiencing the nation and thinking about it.2 What I am 
presenting here are some materials which enter into the construction 
of the various "images” of the nation.3 These materials are of various 
sorts: notions about the past of the group, about its characteristic 
outlook (traits, mentalities), about its culture, etc. Secondly, the 
notions I am dealing with are primarily of a “public” nature, they are 
part of official institutions and discourses: school textbooks, mass- 
media journalism, political speeches and public debates, intellectual 
reflections, etc. The closer contact with political power accounts for 
their strongly ideologised and mythologised character. I am not 
dealing here with the world of everyday lived culture, of individual and
1 Or, as "collectivist” language may be quite misleading, one may define 
national identities as ideas held by individuals about what characterises the 
national community and what it means to belong to it.
2 This plurality of the images of the nation is pointed for example by VAN 
SAS, NICOLAAS “Varieties of Dutchness”, in: A. Galema, B. Henkes, and H. te 
Velde (eds.) Images o f the Nation. Different Meanings o f Dutchness 1870- 
1940. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1993, 5-16.
3 One can make a distinction between an identity as a kind of (static) 
“image” one holds of the nation and “identification” as the (dynamic) process 
of relating oneself to the community; the second notion referring to psychic 




























































































communal subjectivity, cases where national meanings arise from 
modest practices and “private” experiences.4
Notions about the past are one of the components of the national 
identity.5 There exist certain analogies between these and the “origin” 
myths of the so-called “primitive” societies. These narrate the initial 
times and the forefathers of the tribe, its “proper” institutions and 
ways of life. The forefathers in particular are always extraordinary and 
unusual, sometimes superhuman and terrifying. The origins myth 
traces the peripeties of the legendary “history” of the tribe since the 
“first times”; there is a standard reference to the “golden ages”, 
usually placed near the “beginnings” and opposed to later times of 
deterioration and decay (of the customs, the “morals”, etc.). The 
legend may speak about the autochtony of the tribe or about its 
wandering from the legendary proto-motherland to its present-day 
settlements. It narrates wars with other tribes and peace agreements, 
loyalties and betrayal. It sanctifies the order and institutions, created 
by the “cultural heroes” of the tribe and elevates them to a status of 
higher “civilisation”, while the customs and ways of the others are 
ridiculed and rejected as undignified and “barbarian". The tribal myth 
defines the place of the tribe in the world and reveals the reason for 
its existence. Rituals enact the myth periodically, thus imprinting it 
on the “collective consciousness” in a powerful way.
One may say that the nations have their “tribal myths” and historical 
legends (or sagas). Like the tribal myths these ethno-myths speak 
about the “forefathers”; they situate the ethnic group in space and 
time, trace its historical “fate”, assign a meaning to its existence and
4 Richard Johnson warns against equating the sphere of public 
representations with “ideology” (in the sense of false consciousness and 
distortion) and the "private forms" with some authenticity; both are 
conventional, structured by language and generic rules; in both we find a 
mixture of “realist” and fantasy elements, of interest and imagination, of 
plan and wish. See: JOHNSON, R. "Towards a Cultural Theory of the Nation: 
A British-Dutch Dialogue”, 171-172, 192-194.
5 On the use of history: myths of common ancestry, myths of foundation, of 
the golden age, of liberation, migration and election, etc. in constructing a 
national identity, see SMITH, A. National Identity. London: Penguin Books, 
1991, 22-23, 65-66, 128. Historiography can also be used to destroy 
national identities. See VELYCHENKO, S. Shaping Identity in Eastern Europe 
and Russia. Soviet-Russian and Polish Accounts o f Ukrainian History 1914- 




























































































to its future in terms of a special “role”, “mission”, “destiny”, etc.6 
These are “foundation myths” in the widest sense. The purpose of 
narrating events and deeds, of presenting historical personalities, is to 
sanctify a beginning, give an exemplum or establish a precedence, 
thus legitimising the nation (and its state).
Under modem conditions historical “reminiscences” are no longer 
orally transmitted by the keepers of folk wisdom. They are taken care 
of by professional historians, concerned with the historical “truth”. 
Nevertheless they undergo mythical transformations in the process of 
their propagation and popularisation. National history is transformed 
into ethno-mythology in a variety of ways: in the school teaching of 
history, then in political speeches and mass-media discourses, in 
historical films, novels and poems. Nationalist-minded historians are 
the first to mythologise history.7 School teaching of history favours 
mythologising by its very “nature”: it is attributed the task of 
developing patriotism, it is didactically simplifying and it is often 
performed by conservative persons in routine ways.8 Intellectuals 
often refer to the national history in support of their ideas and as a 
source of wisdom.9 Myths are narrated by committed nationalists to 
keep the national “consciousness” alive and by political demagogues 
in their power struggles. Writers, poets, painters and film producers 
exercise their imaginative faculties in depicting historical events and 
figures. Thus propagated, the myths of the national history become a 
common stock of knowledge, part of one’s “general culture”. Extensive 
explanations are hardly needed: an allusion or hint suffice to “call” a
6 The ethnohistory may be compared to the myth in that it is quite 
uncritical, makes use of heterogeneous materials, ignores or does not 
acknowledge contradictions, furnishes explanations that seem illogical, etc. 
Still more importantly, like the myth it functions as a special kind of 
“knowledge", one that furnishes self-justifications and “reasons” for 
attitudes and behaviour.
7 There has been an unbroken tradition of nationalist biased presentation of 
history in Bulgaria since the (national) Revival epoch when it served as a 
weapon in the struggle against the Ottoman domination. National biases of 
all sorts are still present and seem so “natural” that are hardly noticed at all. 
When it comes to the national history it is hardly possible to draw a line 
between professional history and “lay” knowledge of history.
® The teaching of history (and literature) is nation-centred and nationalist 
in most countries: education often has as its express purpose to form a 
national “consciousness” and foster patriotism.
9 The citing of historical “facts" out of their context as an "argument” in 




























































































historical episode to the mind and activate self-identification among a 
receptive public.
Narrating history of the nation (whether in schools or elsewhere) has a 
number of peculiarities. It does not allow for breaks in the historical 
development. There passes through all political events a thread that 
connects the “beginnings” to the present day. It is the nation (or “the 
people”) that creates the unity and continuity in the historical 
narrative by acting as the main protagonist. The history is a history of 
the “nation", projected back to time immemorial. The nation is 
represented or more often implied as identical and “equal" to itself 
through all peripeties of the historical drama. Notwithstanding 
demographic catastrophes and ethnic creolage, even if these are 
admitted, “we” living today are identical with the historical “them”, our 
forefathers. They are the earlier “we”, we are the later “them” - that is 
what is conveyed and implied by the narrative. There are no limits to 
the projection of ethnicity back into history; since the tribal period 
history is “our” history.
The national history is always narrated “from the point of view” of 
one’s own nation. Grammatically the narrative may use the third 
person singular (King A acted so and so....) but the real protagonist is 
the “we” (Bulgarians, French or whosoever). The actions of the ethnic 
“we” are observed with a deep involvement, a complete identification, 
in the same way as one sympathises with the “good guys” in a movie. 
In national history justice and truth are always and only on “our 
side”, while the “others" (other tribes, nations, states, etc.) are evil, 
wicked, treacherous. What is more, “their” history does not interest us 
for its own sake; it comes into focus only when it touches “our” 
history and to the extent that it does so.
The national history manifests a peculiar profile. The most important 
moments are those of military success and political grandeur of the 
ethnic group (res. its state), its cultural flourishing and all that may 
nourish the national pride. On the contrary, the moments of defeat 
and disgrace are downplayed, if not completely ignored. In the 
historical narrative they are allowed a very small space. Here are some 




























































































the nationalist optic.10 My presentation is based on school textbooks 
and personal “ethnographic” experience with public historian debates 
and mass-media discourses, films on the national theme, etc.11
The rougher retrospective versions of the Bulgarian national history 
count the Thracians among the “forefathers”. They are presented as 
“noble" and “civilised”. Best known are the Thracian musician 
Orpheus and the great slave leader Spartacus. It is quite instructive to 
see how this pre-history is integrated into the history of the Bulgarian 
nation: by “omitting” to speak about the extinction of the Thracians, 
by speaking about “Bulgarian lands” when no Bulgarians existed, by 
presentational means that suggest continuity through the very 
ordering of the material, etc. Nationalist “re-tracing” of origins apart, 
the national history begins with the establishment of the first 
Bulgarian kingdom in 681, a result of an alliance between the “proto- 
Bulgarians”, a semi-nomadic tribe of presumably Turkic origin that 
came from Asia to the lower Danube, and several Slav tribes that had 
settled on the Balkans in the previous centuries. The proto-Bulgarians 
are presented as rough horsemen with flags made of horse brushes, 
pagan and militarist. They are the state-building “element”, capable of 
leading wars and of imposing a “state” order, hence they are 
elaborated into an object of patriotic pride. The Slavs are on the 
contrary characterised as meek and peace-loving people, often 
defeated and subjugated by the Byzantine armies. From the 
nationalist point of view the invasion of the Slavs by the proto-
10 When writing the history of his own state (and nation) the historian can 
hardly avoid nationalist biases of one kind or another. Subject matter and 
“values” are in this case closely intertwined and quite inseparable; in a 
certain sense national history tends to become nationalist history. The more 
so when national feelings and attitudes are very alive and the historian as a 
person shares these values. Nationalist “prejudicing" of the cruder type is 
simply inescapable when neither nationalism has been questioned, nor the 
purposes of history writing discussed. Bulgarian historiography originated in 
the national Revival epoch when it was considered as a political weapon in 
national liberation struggles. This national-nationalist tradition of 
historiography continues quite uninterrupted to the present day and has 
never been seriously shattered. The official Bulgarian historiography - the 
“Marxist” cliches in the main but also some nationalist distortions - ware 
satirised by GENCHEV, N. Kratkosmeshna Istoriia. Sofia: Sofia University 
Press, 1990. (The manuscript was read in a closer circle for some years 
before it became for the author possible to publish it.)
11 The nationalist school teaching of history has been studied by FERRO, M. 





























































































Bulgarians (or the alliance between them) appears as a salvation of 
the Slavs from Byzantine “assimilation”, as if there had been a unified 
Byzantine ethnos or a nationalist policy of “assimilation of minorities”.
The “relative weight” of the different ethnies and their “contribution” 
to the Bulgarian state and the Bulgarian nation present a particularly 
appropriate topic for nationalist speculation. That is not to say that all 
scholarly debate and the various hypotheses about the origin of the 
proto-Bulgarians are falsified with nationalist or other “ideological” 
purposes in mind, though they often have some motivation in 
nationalist preferences and biases.12 But the historical “theories" and 
hypotheses are introduced for exactly such purposes in the public 
debates and are assigned a respective interpretation. Thus, depending 
on the demand, one may put forward the proto-Bulgarian 
“contribution” (e.g. when military virtues are to be encouraged) or the 
Slav “element” (if the “brotherhood" with the Russians is to be 
stressed) or even the Thracians - in looking for old and noble origins, 
or in stressing the significance of “culture”.
The early Bulgarian khans feature primarily with their military 
exploits. A  very impressive figure among them is Krum (nicknamed 
the Horrible) reputed to have broken the skull of the Byzantine 
emperor Nicephorus. No school textbook omits to mention this fact, 
presumably to inspire awe and enhance the national pride of the 
school-boy. The way the alphabet was introduced in Bulgaria is highly 
relevant from a nationalist point of view. It is known that the Cyrillic 
alphabet was invented by the brothers Cyril and Methodius on an 
order from the Byzantine emperor, as part of his plans for domination 
over the Slav tribes. This fact was simply absent from school 
textbooks while a lot of weight was placed on “proving” the Slav 
background of the two brothers. Whatever the historical truth, the 
very sensitivity to questions of ethnicity is typical of a nationalist
12 in some cases this is quite obvious, as in the militant patriotism of Todor 
Panov who advocated the hypothesis of the Hun origin of the proto- 
Bulgarians (inspired, quite explicitly, by the military exploits of Atila), while 
at the same time denying the role of the Slavs (the “Slav fable” as he called 
it). See PANOV, T. Psikhologiia na bulgarskiia narod. Veliko Tumovo, 1992 




























































































narrative.13 The wars of the Bulgarian khans (and kings) to annex 
territories populated by Slavs are presented as “liberation” and 
salvation of the Slavs from ethnic assimilation. The behaviour of these 
tribes creates some problems for the nationalist point of view, 
especially the fact that they seem to have taken belonging to the 
Bulgarian state quite light-heartedly and often split from it or even 
preferred to join Byzantine.14 Not that the existence of the nation is 
directly posed for those times. But it is the national “idea” (and its 
presuppositions) that guide the interpretation of events and is 
responsible for what is stressed and what is omitted from the 
narrative. The presentation and treatment of a number of issues, even 
in the early (pre-national) history is thus guided by nationalist biases.
The history of the medieval period (first and second Bulgarian 
kingdoms) is narrated in different ways. There is first the officially 
approved narrative (accepted in the history textbooks) which stresses 
military victories against the Byzantine empire and glorifies successful 
kings: Simeon the Great (893-927), Kaloyan (1197-1207) who defeated 
the crusaders, Ivan Assen II (1218-1241). The tragic events of the 
subjugation of the first Bulgarian kingdom by the Byzantine empire 
are presented in detail and widely known by the Bulgarian public. The 
nationalist “rationale” for including such “disgraceful” events in the 
narrative is that Samuil’s kingdom was based in Macedonia, which is 
taken as historical proof of the Bulgarian claims over this region.15 
The century and a half long Byzantine domination (1018-1185) is 
passed over in haste in the school textbooks as an inconvenient locus 
for a narrative designed to infuse with national pride. There is in 
medieval history the never realised dream of the Bulgarian kings (and
For the same nationalist reasons the official Soviet historiography was 
very reluctant to admit that the Russians adopted the Cyrillic alphabet from 
Bulgaria. It was still more reluctant to acknowledge the important role of 
Scandinavians (Vikings) in the establishment of the Kiev kingdom - this so- 
called "varyagi hypothesis” was simply waved away.
14 The same problem for the nationalist historicism arises for the epoch of 
the Bulgarian higher "Middle ages” and especially the fourteenth century. 
Various regions split then from the state to be either independent or to join 
Byzantine - thus contradicting the expectations of the nationalists.
1 ̂  The northern parts of the state and the capital Preslav were first invaded 
by the troops of the Russian kniaz Svetoslav and then by the Byzantine 
empire. During the communist rule, the historical episode of the Russian 





























































































even more of nationalists) of taking Constantinople, the capital of the 
empire. Textbook authors (and historians in general) never fail to 
mention all the occasions when Bulgarian armies besieged the capital 
city, always presented as on the verge of falling, were it not for 
unhappy "accidents” or treason.16 There is alongside this standard 
narrative the somewhat pessimistic thesis according to which the 
advancing “Byzantination” of the Bulgarian aristocracy and clergy 
exerted a pernicious effect over the historical development of the 
medieval Bulgarian kingdoms. Instead of allowing for a natural growth 
and a gradual accumulation of forces, the thesis goes, the imitation 
and copying of the more powerful Byzantine culture resulted in a 
fateful and tragic estrangement between “leaders" and “the people” 
and provoked reactions of “negation” (heresies, social movements of 
discontent) thus undermining the foundations of the state.17 This 
pessimistic version of the medieval history of Bulgaria was suppressed 
(and even banned) during the state socialist period for ideological 
reasons: it was suspect for its “elitism", its lack of patriotism, and it 
was not attuned to the optimistic key of the socialist ideology. Yet it is 
nonetheless markedly nationalist: such contemporary debates as the 
role of the national leaders, “negativism” in Bulgarian history, what 
does a “sound” development mean in terms of tradition versus foreign 
influences, etc., appear here under historical guise.18
16 Nobody even bothers to ask the question of what would have happened if 
Constantinople had been taken after all: could it have been kept under 
Bulgarian rule, which of course is most improbable, and what about the 
remaining parts of the vast empire. Taking Constantinople even for a very 
short time would have meant the “crowning" of military exploits in which the 
nationalist imagination rejoices.
17 This view was developed most consistently in the thirties by the well- 
known Bulgarian historian MUTAFCHIEV, P. "Kum filosofiiata na bulgarskata 
istoriia (Vizantinismut v srednovekovna Bulgaria)", Filosofski pregled, 3, 1, 
1931 27-36; MUTAFCHIEV, P. “Pop Bogomil i Sv. Ivan Rilski (Duhut na 
otritsanieto v nashata istoriia)", Filosofski Pregled, 6, 2 (1934), 97-112; 
MUTAFCHIEV, P. “Bulgaria i hristianstvoto”, in: Mutafchiev, P. Kniga za 
bulgarite. Sofia, 1987, 169-189, esp. 187-189.
1® Alongside the national perspective to Bulgarian history there was, 
especially during the communist regime, the Marxist perspective with its 
typical stress upon “class struggle". For the pre-capitalist epochs it 
produced some very distorted and even absurd interpretations. Thus, for 
example, religious heresies such as the “Bogomilism” (exported to France 
and Italy in the twelfth and the thirteenth century under the names 
“Kathari” and “Albigenses”) were sometimes treated as a class protest (“in a 
religious form”); the peasant uprising of Ivailo (middle of the thirteenth 




























































































Those events that attest of glory acquire special salience in the 
national perspective. If there is no glory and success, then examples 
of tragic heroism and staunch resistance are selected, ignoring those 
of treason and surrendering to the enemy. In Bulgarian history this 
filter is applied to the events of the Ottoman invasion (at the end of 
the fourteenth century) and for the almost five century long period of 
subjugation. The cases of compulsory conversion to Islam are strongly 
blown up in the national mythology, contrary to the prevalent opinion 
among Osmanist scholars about the relative religious tolerance of the 
Ottoman empire and ignoring the fact that a lot of Bulgarians 
voluntarily accepted Islam, attracted by some privileges of the “true 
believers”. What is more, the fact of religious conversion is equated to 
ethnic (and national) assimilation, projecting nineteenth and 
twentieth century concerns back into the fifteenth and the sixteenth 
century and onto an empire that never really aspired to ethnic 
homogenisation. But it is not the veracity of the historical facts nor 
the (unavoidable) selectivity of their representation in the history texts 
that matters. What matters most is their functioning as explanations 
and justifications of the present, in the Bulgarian case they could be 
put forward as a justification for the reprisals against the Turkish 
minority in 1984 and afterwards. Application to political purposes is 
what turns history into a mythological narrative.19
The almost five century long period of the Ottoman domination 
appears from the point of view of the national history as a continuous 
resistance: heroism, sufferance and a fight for survival.20 The rather
have been against the “feudal order", as attested by his becoming king, etc., 
etc.
1® The anti-Turkish campaign of 1984 in Bulgaria was accompanied by 
assigning to some subservient historians the task of unearthing facts about 
the Turkish atrocities in the past as well as evidence that the Turkish 
minority in contemporary Bulgaria originates for the greater part from 
Bulgarians, converted by force to Islam, so as to justify their re-christening 
with Bulgarian names. The problem here is of course not the veracity of the 
facts (some of these were true, others not), and even not the relevance of 
singular isolated facts for “proving” a thesis, but the use made of remote 
history for political purposes. While this is an extreme example of political 
manipulation of history, nationalist history is always made to bear in some 
way to the present: providing “reasons" and “justifications”, “proving” claims, 
etc.
20 The very epoch of the subjugation under the Ottoman empire was (and 




























































































heterogeneous “haiduks” who were in most cases bandits, robbing 
Christian and Muslim alike, are heroised and presented as self- 
conscious rebels against the “yoke” and “precursors” of the national 
revolutionaries. Ethno-history cannot admit that the Bulgarian 
population may have been largely indifferent to the Turkish 
“oppressors” and may have peacefully coexisted with them for most of 
the time and in most places.* 21 There is still less recognition for the 
heretic view that until the liberation a great part of the population 
possessed some kind of local and regional but hardly an enveloping 
“national” consciousness.
In history narrated from a national perspective the formation of the 
nation is no doubt the “crowning” epoch. In Bulgarian history this has 
been the so called (national) Revival epoch, coinciding roughly with 
the nineteenth century. The period has been heroised and sanctified 
accordingly. Most of the national heroes and saints are derived from 
this epoch and for good reasons. While one may call “national heroes” 
all personalities who played an important role in the history of one of 
the modem nations, those that contributed to the “making of the 
nation” are the national heroes par excellence. As “Enlighteners” and 
“awakers" o f the nation, that is, cultivators o f a “national 
consciousness” or arms in hand, they contributed to the national 
cause and fought for the national liberation.22 Leaving aside the 
objective merits and contributions of national heroes, one may go into
Bulgarian Osmanist historians two or three years ago to introduce the more 
neutral term "Ottoman domination” in the school textbooks encountered 
bitter resistance from school teachers in history (and some nationalist 
journalists), attesting to the deep rootedness and emotioned investment in 
“resistance" and "sufferance” representations. "Why do you insist so much 
on having been “slaves”? - was the response of the Osmanists who knew 
how to counter nationalism with nationalism. Intentionally calling (until 
recently) the domination “Turkish” instead of “Ottoman” and thus making 
an allusion to Turkey and the Turkish minority in Bulgaria is another 
instance of history made to bear directly upon the present, and used as a 
political instrument.
21 An attitude of betrayal, disgraceful as it sounds, is easier to admit from a 
national point of view than indifference and the lack of any nationally 
coloured attitude; besides it serves edifying purposes as a negative example 
to be condemned.
22 It is comparatively easy to reach a national “consensus" on the 
importance of people who fought for a national cause. They “stand for” the 
nation as a whole, not for a particular political ideology or a party. Besides 
national revolutionaries only “great statesmen” may aspire to universal 




























































































the symbolic use made of them in later periods. They function as 
“exemplary” personalities, a personification of the virtues of the 
nation, its worthiest sons, a paragon to be admired and emulated, or 
at least an “ideal” to be referred to with a moralising intention. They 
become centres of collective cults and rituals, the national (state) 
celebrations in the first place.23 The “heroisation” is thus a way of 
creating “symbolic capital” to be appropriated by different political 
forces and used for their own legitimation.
Next in the historical narrative comes the period from the 
establishment of the independent Bulgarian state as a result of the 
Russian-Turkish war (1877-1878) until 1944. The national self- 
respect and pride are once again nourished primarily by military 
victories24 and the one successful national undertaking - the 
Unification (in 1885) of Kingdom Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, the 
parts into which the Bulgarian lands were divided by the Berlin 
Congress in 1878. The national pride is however deeply hurt by the 
two national catastrophes: the defeats in the Balkan wars and in 
World War I and the loss of Macedonia - the main motive for the 
participation of Bulgaria in these wars. As in Germany, the myths 
about the “stroke in the back”, “treacherous allies”, etc., appear as 
typical means for healing the wounds and restoring the national pride.
Most of the political events and personalities of the period from 1878 
to 1944 appear in popular ethnohistory (and in the professional 
history writing) as “controversial". The reasons for that are mainly
23 As R. Johnson notes, “quintessential” and exemplary figures presuppose 
“Others” in an "intermediate position” and outright villains. See JOHNSON, 
R. “Towards a Cultured Theory of the Nation: A British-Dutch Dialogue”, 
204-207. National "ideals” are classificatory devises. In Bulgarian 
historiography this is quite obvious in the established hierarchy with the 
national revolutionaries on the top, activists in the struggle for an 
independent Church below them and “pure enlighteners” still further below. 
Whole classes may function as better or worse embodiments of the nation. 
As regards the nation, intellectuals and the “bourgeoisie” usually occupy the 
central position. Contrary to real merits in the liberation struggles there was 
in Bulgarian Marxist historiography after 1944 the glorification of the 
peasants: only in the seventies was the leading role of the “bourgeoisie" (in 
this case mostly traders and craftsmen) asserted, mainly due to the efforts of 
the Bulgarian historian N. Genchev.
24 No Bulgarian army banner was captured in the Balkan wars and World 
War I, as the military often boast, blaming the Bulgarian political leaders 




























































































political. The communist regime had for a time imposed by force its 
own (party) heroes, especially those of the founder of the party 
Dimitur Blagoev, and its best internationally known figure Georgy 
Dimitrov. It tried to raise them to the status of “national” heroes by 
erecting monuments and setting up official cults, and through intense 
ideological propaganda. The actual coincidence between state and 
Party also contributed to the success of this manipulation, as it 
blurred the distinction between party heroes and national heroes. 
These heroes did not however outlive the regime; they are demonised 
today as nationally nihilist, having served as instruments of the Soviet 
domination, and as perpetrators of Stalinist atrocities and 
totalitarianism.
The fall of the communist regime precipitated symbolic fights between 
the political parties for revaluation and reappropriation of the more 
recent (pre-communist) past. The “resurrected” or even the newly 
created parties are now taking up “their” political leaders and 
ideologues in the past as emblem-figures, presenting themselves as 
heirs to them and claiming their authority. Thus they are obstructing 
the rise of these figures to a “higher" national level (of “great 
politicians”, “statesmen”, perfect “democrats”, etc.).25 As a result no 
widely recognised national “heroes” stem from this period, except for 
some “Kulturtraeger" personalities. Now that no single political force 
is able to usurp the whole political space and to impose its own 
heroes (and interpretation of the past), elevating personalities from 
recent history to a status of “national heroes” would require a more 
“neutral” or “above party” point of view, especially that of “statism”. 
This point of view presupposes however a more “settled” political 
situation, more stable political parties, firmer rules of political 
conduct, and a more developed “civil society” in general, than are 
actually in existence.
Something should be said at this point about how ethnohistory serves 
the needs of self-identification. To start with, it creates emotional
25 The only Bulgarian statesmen somewhat better placed in both the 
professional and the lay notions is Stefan Stambolov (prime-minister 1886- 
1894), who pursued a nationally-oriented policy and has the reputation of 
resolutely putting Bulgaria on the road of modernisation, while at the same 




























































































investments. It is designed to nourish a feeling of national pride and 
self-respect - a peculiar ethnic “honour". The national pride can be 
derived from different sources: from economic, social, political or 
cultural achievements. In the case of Bulgaria a rather primitive kind 
of pride was promoted, the one based primarily on military exploits 
and territorial acquisitions, while the cultural achievements (in school 
teaching at least) were somewhat in the background. Shameful and 
disgraceful events are quite unbearable for national self-respect and 
cannot be accepted in the image of the nation. If not directly forgotten 
(or ignored) they are reinterpreted, so as to be compatible with the 
national pride. A history of foreign domination, for instance, becomes 
more “acceptable” if antedated and accompanied by heroic resistance: 
national defeats are more tolerable if “exteriorised” and blamed on 
others. (To speak about the rehabilitative re-direction towards others 
of the “blame" for failures is not to deny that outside factors were 
active in shaping the historical reality.)
Self-identification through ethnohistory proceeds in a peculiar way, 
namely by making use of the time dimension.26 The individual 
member of the ethno-cultural community perceives himself as the 
successor and heir of ancestors who authored certain deeds and 
perpetrated certain events. He identifies himself with an imaginary 
enduring community, an ever renewed community, whose present-day 
members are successors of the ancestors; this relation is perceived on 
the model of kinship, as a "blood tie". The actual and direct bonds 
between the members of the community - such as the exchange of 
goods, services, communications, etc. - are complemented by indirect 
imaginary bonds: the notion of a “common” origin and of marching 
"together” through history.27 The collective solidarity thus established 
extends from the past to the present and leads to an anticipation of a
26 For the role of the time dimension in establishing the idenUty of a society 
(and a nation in particular) see SHILS, E. Tradition. Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1981, 162-194, esp. 163-168. Identities (and a sense of 
membership) are established by a common name, a reference to the identity 
of territory and a belief in some sort of identity of the living generation with 
the past generations. As Shils points out, such identities are not “mythical” 
but real, because they are taken seriously by a lot of persons and because of 
the real consequences.
27 Already E. Renan in his classical text pointed to the solidarising function 
of the historical memories, of common fights and sufferance even more than 
of victories. See RENAN, E. Che cos’e una nazione? (traduzione di Gregorio 




























































































common future. The fusion between past, present and future, of 
memories and expectations is best expressed by the word “fate” with 
its dramatic and tragic undertones. Through historical notions the 
individual links his own biography to the fate of the nation and 
experiences the fate of the nation as his own fate.
Certain dangers are inherent in this way of experiencing the past and 
in basing one’s identity upon it. The distinction between past and 
present may become blurred and may even disappear in extreme 
eruptions of nationalist sentiment. The remote past may then acquire 
a powerful actuality and vividness in the minds. Events that 
happened long ago under a foreign domination seem to have 
happened only yesterday; what is more, they require retaliation. The 
individual feels urged to take revenge on that member of the old 
enemy who happens to be near him at the moment, even if he is his 
neighbour. Not only are past and present mixed up but nations are 
assimilated to families and kin and members of nations are supposed 
to think and act as in a family vendetta; revenge is to be administered 
indiscriminately and it is of a kind that time does not extinguish.
Personal memories are subject to continuous changes - what I 
experienced loses its initial contours and presents itself to me in an 
ever new light. This has to do not only with forgetfulness due to the 
passing of the time but mainly with the reinterpretation of the events 
in accordance with new experiences and objectives. The change affects 
not only separate memories but the past life as a whole. It is 
reconstituted again and again according to a new teleological logic; 
autobiography is always being rewritten. One may look at shared 
history from the perspective of memorisation and speak in terms of 
collective “recollections” and the making of a collective “biography”.28 
In the case of distant events there is no actual recollection, as one 
generation has a limited life-span and a limited pool of experiences. 
Unlike personal experiences, historical events are documented and 
preserved in archives and books; care about the historical “memories”
28 As E. Shils points out recollection (of the past) cannot be reduced to acts 
of recollection and involves a sort of sedimentation in tradition. - SHILS, E. 
Tradition, 167. On remembering see for example RADLEY, A. "Artifacts, 
Memory, and Sense of the Past”, in: Middleton, D and D. Edwards (eds.) 





























































































is entrusted to certain people as their specialised task. But like the 
memory of the individual the ethnic traditions are highly selective and 
“plastic".29 In shaping the past, “accommodations” of all sorts are 
made to the new life experiences, needs and wishes of the new 
generations. What “facts” would be admitted to the “memory” of the 
nation is also regulated by institutions with their institutionalised 
objectives and discourses. The system of education plays a major role 
in this selection, in pseudo “reminding” and keeping distant 
“memories” alive in the “collective consciousness”.30 The “biography” 
of the nation is thus rewritten time and again. And this is hardly 
perceived.
* * *
Another central notion in building up a national identity is that of a 
“national character” (or “national mentality”).31 The national “traits” 
are often referred to in everyday life, either in criticism or as 
something to be proud of; they are a theme of myths and jokes. There 
are even systematic studies under the rubric “national psychology” 
(Voelkerpsychologie), sometimes claiming the status of a science. 
There is, furthermore, the reference to a “national culture”, ranging 
from customs and ways of life to a “national food” and a “national 
cuisine”.32 Using Bulgarian materials of a more “learned” type I will
29 Already Renan pointed out that for a nation to be formed, it is at least as 
important that the people should forget a lot of things. See RENAN, E. “Che 
cos’e una nazione?”, 8. Thus forgetting, omission, eclipse or occlusion 
belong as much, and may be even more, to nation-building, as does 
remembering.
30 in speaking about a "collective memory” (or “collective consciousness”, 
representations, experiences, etc.) there is always the danger of some sort of 
collectivist metaphysic, that is of attributing mind or spirit to the community 
as such. Here “collective” is equivalent to "shared" and refers to the fact that 
representations, memories, etc. have the "community” as their locus.
31 On the genesis of the notion of “national character" see for example 
SZEGEDY-MASZAK, M. “The Idea of National Character: A Romantic 
Heritage", in: Peter Boemer (ed.) Concepts o f National Identity. Baden-Baden: 
Nomos Verlagsgesellshaft, 1986, 45-62 and the extensive bibliography, 
complied by Udo Rossbach and Nancy Boemer in the same book, 195-262. 
On the notions of “national character" and "national genius” see also SMITH, 
A. National Identity. 84-86.
32 Notions about specific “national food” and the national "cuisine” form 
part of the complex of national identities. Among Bulgarian specialities in 
particular are white cheese and yoghurt (of a special • type). It is another 
question whether a "national cooking” is specifically national in origin and 
geographical range, and whether (and to what extent) people really cook and 




























































































consider the forces at work in establishing a “character” type of 
identity.
The notion of a national character presupposes a set of constant 
traits, which are attributed to the nation or to its “typical” (or 
"average”) representative.33 To reach such an abstraction one 
proceeds by homogenisation, ignoring social differences. De- 
historisation is also effected, equating mentality characteristics in 
different phases of the historical development. It is true that some of 
the Bulgarian authors are registering changes in the national 
mentality under the impact of the modernisation, differentiating 
between “the Bulgarian” of traditional society (“patriarchal epoch”) 
and the modem “type”; sometimes social categories are differentiated 
as well (e. g. the peasants and the educated) and even regional 
character types34. Still, the whole undertaking is driven by the 
aspiration to discover some “ideal” or authentic (asocial and 
transhistoric) Bulgarian personality type and there is a marked 
tendency to consider traits outside the context and to universalise 
them. The attempts to describe a “national character” are, so to say, 
predisposed to “essentialism” and etemisation.35
Attitudes to work, to the state, to religion and “morals”, to sexuality, 
etc. appear in all possible modalities in descriptions of (the Bulgarian)
33 The ideas about a national character or a national mentality in Bulgaria 
were taken over from nineteenth century German “Voelkerpsychologie”. 
There was also in the U. S. A. (before World War II) a trend in cultural 
anthropology - the so-called “culture and personality studies” - concerned 
with how culture, care for the children in particular, shaped character. It 
was however more cautious in employing the notion of a national character 
and introduced terms such as “modal” (or "basic”) character as a kind of 
substratum, upon which individual and social group variations were 
superimposed.
34 Thus A. Strashimirov differentiates between a “Thracian" (that is, 
Southern Bulgarian) type , a “Moesian” type (those living in the Northern 
part), Macedonians, “Shopi” (people from a region near Sofia) and “Ruptsi" - 
STRASHIMIROV, A. Kniga za bulgarite. Sofia, 1918 (cited from Draganov, M. 
(ed.)Narodopsikhologiia na bulgarite. Antologiia. Sofia, 1984, 461-472. The 
attempts to differentiate regional types may be even more questionable, 
when names of regions are eo ipso equated to types.
35 As R. Johnson puts it, phrases like "cultures or ways of life in Britain” 
easily slip into "British culture”, "the British way of life” or "British 
character"; some everyday meanings and values become “the" national 
culture. See: JOHNSON, R. "Towards a Cultural Theory of the Nation: A 




























































































national mentality. Depending on whether the stress Is put upon 
negative or positive characteristics, it is possible to speak of a 
pessimistic or an optimistic version o f “people's psychology”. 
Sometimes the traits are only stated, in other cases reference to 
historical epochs and circumstances is made to account for them. 
One may compose a catalogue of the various traits and attitudes and 
juxtapose contradictory opinions.36 Some authors are searching 
(whether explicitly or not) for the authentic traits of the people’s 
character in a highly idealised “traditional epoch”; such typically 
“collectivist” virtues are then evoked as hard working, love for the soil, 
hospitality, sociability, etc.37 A love for liberty, a drive towards 
equality and democratic dispositions have been derived from the 
voluntary management of community and school affairs during the 
national Revival epoch and from the lack of a Bulgarian (feudal) 
aristocracy (exterminated by the Ottoman invaders).38 Interest in 
communal affairs was seen as a durable Bulgarian “stereotype".39 
Others, on the contrary, view the Ottoman domination as a source of 
serf vices, of social immaturity and cultural backwardness, and refer 
to it in explaining the lack of a democratic “spirit" to animate the 
democratic institutions after the liberation.40 A number of authors 
evoke such “anti-social” traits as the lack of social responsibility, 
evading of social duties or incorrectness in accomplishing them, 
disregard for the laws, extreme corporate egoism, etc.41 There seems
36 Sometimes “one and the same” trait may be interpreted as either negative 
(bad) or positive (good), e. g. the presumably negative attitude of the 
Bulgarian to the state, which may be read as attesting either an independent 
spirit or inability for public life.
37 PETKANOV, K. “Kharaktemi cherti na bulgarina” in: Draganov, M. (ed.) 
Narodopsikhologiia na bulgarite., 539-548, esp. 539-541, 548; KOSTURKOV, 
S. Vurkhu psikhologiiata na bulgarina. Sofia, 1949 (cited from 
Narodopsikhologiia na bulgarite, 647-650, 659-661; PANOV, T. Psikhologiia 
na bulgarskiia narod, 267.
38 HADZHIISKI, I. “Istoricheskite koreni na nashite demokratichni traditsii”, 
in: Hadzhiiski, I. Suchinenia v dva toma. Voi. 1, 86-87, 89, 95-99; PANOV, T. 
Psikhologiia na bulgarskiia narod, 225.
39 STRASHIMIROV, A. Kniga za bulgarite. (cited from Narodopsikhologiia na 
bulgarskiia narod, 494-495); Hadzhiiski, I. “Optimistichna teoriia za nashiia 
narod”, in: Hadzhiiski, I. Suchineniia u dva toma. Voi. 1, Sofìa, 1974, 35-36.
40 MIKHAILOVSK1, S. “Kak zapadat 1 se provaliat durzhavite” , in: 
Mikhailovski, S. Neizdadeni suchineniia. Voi. 1, Sofìa 1940. 183-186.
41 GULUBOV, K. “Psikhologiia na bulgarina", Bulgarska Misul, 9, 2 (1934), 
115-116; PENEV, B. Istoriia na novata bulgarska literatura. Voi. 1, Sofia, 
1976 (cited from Narodopsikhologiia na bulgarite, 116-118); KRUSTNIKOV, N. 




























































































to be a far reaching agreement among students of the national 
character on some negative traits, such as suspiciousness, malice, the 
inability to work in a team, constant intriguing, etc., derived, it would 
seem, from regrettable personal experiences with political life and life 
in institutional settings.42 Certain accounts render (either approvingly 
or disapprovingly) “the Bulgarian” as “always” sceptical of the state 
and the rulers; the lack of an independent state for almost five 
centuries is cited as an explanation for this “negativism”. Religious 
attitudes are another favourite topic for speculation with opinions 
ranging from an affirmation of deep Christian religiosity through 
paganism to atheism. Early (and recurring) paganism and medieval 
heresies are taken as a proof of assertions that the Bulgarian is “by 
his nature” an atheist and a non-believer.43 In discussing sexuality 
again some are asserting the “prudence” and even great sexual 
restraint of “the” Bulgarian,44 while others are imagining “sexual 
animism” (or “sex-pantheism”).45 Tolerance towards the ethnic 
minorities (Turks, Gypsies, Jews and Armenians) and towards 
foreigners has been listed among the specifically Bulgarian virtues.46
One may point to a number of weaknesses in the various attempts to 
provide a description of the “national character” and of the enterprise 
in general: simplifications and homogenisation of all sorts, 
arbitrariness as to geographic boundaries, impossibility to test.
(cited from Narodopsikhologiia na bulgarite, 455-460); SHEITANOV, N. 
"Duchut na otritsanieto u bulgarina”, Filosofski preged, 5, 2 (1933), 128- 
141, esp. 128-133.
42 To cite just a few: PENEV, B. Istoriia na novata bulgarska literatura (cited 
from Narodopsikhologiia na bulgarite, 516-518); KOSTURKOV, S. Vurkhu 
psichologiiata na bulgarina. (cited from: Narodopsikhologiia na bulgarite, 
447); KRUSTNIKOV, N. Opit za psikhologicheski analiz na nashiia obshtestven 
zhivot (cited from: Narodopsikhologiia na bulgarite, 450-453); GULUBOV, K. 
“Psichologiia na bulgarina", Bulgarska misul 9, 2 (1934), 116.
43 SHEITANOV, N. “Khiliada-godishninata na Boian Magesnika”, Zlatorog, 4, 
4 (1923), 242-245; Mikhailovski, N. “Kak zapadat i se provaliat durzhavite”, 
111- 112.
44 GIDIKOV. S. “Polovata svitost na bulgarina kato osnova na negoviia 
kharacter”, Filosofski pregled, 6, 2 (1934), 123-132. The presumed sexual 
restraint is generalised here to a major explanation for a number of 
"negative” traits of the Bulgarian character.
45 SHEITANOV, N. “Seksualnata filosofia na bulgarina”, Filosofski pregled, 4, 
3 (1932), 241-256.
46 KOSTURKOV, S. Vurkhu psikhologiiata na bulgarina (cited from 





























































































contradictions between the various accounts that lay bare the 
dubiousness of the whole undertaking, etc. A  peculiar mixture of 
fantasy and reality, wishes and experience, the ideas about a national 
character recognise few limitations and constraints. They appear thus 
as highly arbitrary and artificial, as an exercise in pure “imagining".47 
On the other hand, it can hardly be denied that the various 
descriptions of the national mentality (or culture) contain personal 
life-experiences which authenticate them. It is rather the 
“naturalisation” of these experiences into timeless “essences”, their 
universalisation and the closure to other experiences that undermines 
their credibility. Via notions such as a “national character” (or “traits” 
or “attitudes” or a “stereotype”), the Nation is “naturalised” and fixed 
into a “being”.
A  critique from a purely “veracity to reality” viewpoint would hardly 
lead us very far. What is more, one may question the line between 
“imaginative” and “real”. Here as elsewhere, social constructions are 
part of reality itself; representations are “social facts” and may have 
social effects. It seems more rewarding to view the various attempts to 
define the nation as proposals to “construct” it in a certain way. They 
can thus be understood as discursive strategies (or rhetorical moves) 
in which power is involved, or as work o f “education” and 
“civilisation”. The usual descriptive language in which traits are 
presented as “given” and “natural” may hide prescriptive and 
normative claims, attempts at social intervention, etc. 48
To return to the Bulgarian examples. There may be a critical intention 
tied to the author’s contemporary realities. Criticism may be 
expressed in a number of ways. For instance, by presenting a totally 
pessimistic account of the national character, “naturalising" some 
negative features. Or by presenting a positive account of the national 
mentality and culture while locating virtues in some idealised
47 All identities are of course "imagined” as they are created and maintained
in people's minds. What strikes in the case of imagining a national 
community however is that the imagined entity is not immediately "present”, 
unlike the familial or the professional group. That is why they appear as 
“too” artificial or fabricated. See for a similar argument ANDERSON, B. 
Imagined Communities. Thetford, Norfolk: The Thetford Press, 1983, 15-16. 





























































































(“patriarchal”, “traditional", “collectivist”) past and opposing them to 
the present "corruption” of the national character. The mentality of 
the people during the “capitalist” (or the state socialist) epoch has 
often been opposed to the unspoiled "authentic” national character in 
the Revival epoch; in more unrestrained fantasies pristineness is 
sought as far back as the medieval times or even in the pagan 
(“barbarian”) epoch. When direct social critique is forbidden, as under 
state socialism, even a wishful evoking of characteristics such as 
social activism, sense of justice and readiness to fight for it, initiative, 
scepticism as regards the state and the rulers, etc., may attest to a 
critical intention. 49 On certain occasions descriptions of national 
traits may function as an encouragement, an infusion of optimism. It 
is not rare to hear in the streets, on T. V. and on the radio during the 
present (postcommunist) crisis that “the Bulgarian” is a practical and 
sensible person, he learns easily by “nature”, he is inventive and can 
cope with everything. That reassuring figure is ascribed general 
intelligence or special talents - in music, mathematics, etc. Or, 
national character notions may serve as explanations of the social 
reality, e. g. democracy is deficient because mentalities are politically 
“unripe” (history may eventually be referred to as responsible for 
shaping those mentalities). There also exists the “metaphysical” 
interest of certain intellectuals in questions as: how were people 
formed by the rather stormy “crossroad” history of the Balkans, what 
does it mean to be a Bulgarian, what experience of life is involved in 
this, etc. A  communication of personal life experiences, a "variable” in 
explaining social realities, a kind of wishful thinking, a form of social 
criticism and a bid for change, a way of self-encouragement, a 
reflection on “destinies” or whatever - ideas about the national 
“character” have multiple sources of inspiration and fulfil numerous 
functions, of which the “cognitive” is but one, and it is inextricably 
intertwined with others.
* * *
Certain objects or persons become national symbols, that is they are 
supposed to contain the national “idea” in a condensed form and to
49 It is not by chance that interest in the national character was renewed in 
the last decades of the socialist regime. It could serve as some vague and 
indirect (but still perceived) form of criticism. An example is: SEMOV, M. 




























































































“express” and convey it in a forceful way.50 Unlike face-to-face 
relationships symbols bind people indirectly, facilitating the formation 
of encompassing units (such as nation-states).51 There are, first of all, 
the official national symbols, such as the national flag, the anthem, 
the coat of arms, or the national coinage.52 Other symbols have been 
invented for international publicity purposes, e. g. in trade or tourism. 
A  Bulgarian example is the rose, connected with the picturesque 
“Valley of roses” and the traditional production of rose oil. A  sign that 
simply “designates” may have a glorious career of a “symbol”, when it 
comes to "express” ideas and convey richer meanings.53 Conversely, a 
symbol may “degenerate” into a simple sign, when some of its 
meanings are lost. Some symbols have a merely “historical value”, 
that is they had their national meaning in certain historical epochs 
but lost it afterwards. The “kalpak” (a kind of hat) was an object 
charged with a national meaning for Bulgarians under the Ottoman 
domination, when it was opposed (self-consciously so) to the Turkish 
“fes”.54
National symbols are not naturally given. They become symbols as a 
result of interpretations, which invest them with national meanings. 
One may find examples of national hermeneutic in the national 
literature and in studies on its history, in art and art criticism and in 
intellectual discourses. An important task of the school teaching in 
native language and literature is to develop the imagination of the 
children in discovering national meanings and connotations of certain 
deeds and objects in texts that are especially selected in the 
curriculum. In what follows I will consider some of the more
50 As Anthony Smith puts it, the basic concepts of nationalism are 
embodied by the national symbols and expressive ceremonials, which are 
making them “visible and distinct for every member, communicating the 
tenets of an abstract ideology in palpable, concrete terms that evoke instant 
emotional responses from all strata of the community” - SMITH, A. National 
Identities, 77. A little further (p. 78) he points that in the national rites and 
symbols the national community makes itself to an object of self-adoration, 
dispensing of any mediating referent, such as a totem or a deity.
51 See ELIAS, N. "Human Interdependencies - Problems of Social Bonds”, in: 
Elias, N. What is Sociology?, London: Hutchinson, 1978, 137-138.
52 i will not deal here with strongly formalised symbols like these because 
hardly anyone reflects on their meanings.
53 Thus blue jeans and coca-cola came to symbolise the “American way of 
life”.
54 In later times the “kalpak" came to symbolise rural, as opposed to town 




























































































elaborated Bulgarian national symbols, reflecting on how they came to 
acquire their symbolic significance.55
The Balkans seem to be a naturally given symbol of “Bulgarian-ness”. 
They have played an important role in the history of Bulgaria: as a 
strategic defensive line of the medieval Bulgarian kingdom in its wars 
against the Byzantine empire, a fortress where the Bulgarian ethnic 
potential, the folk customs and ways of life, the ethos of freedom, etc. 
were best preserved during the Ottoman domination, as a preferred 
place for hermits and monks, a refuge for the rebellious “haiduks”.56 
The historical significance of the Balkans becomes a point of 
departure for its subsequent poétisation and transformation into a 
national symbol, first in the folk songs and legends, later in literature 
and literary essays. Given the actual functions of the Balkans in 
Bulgarian history it is only “natural" to imagine them as a guardian or 
a warrior and to "personalise” them. But the poet does not stop here, 
rather he transforms them into a defendant of “his” people.57
During the Ottoman domination the Balkans were a refuge for the 
most indomitable and intransigent men. They were hiding there while 
taking revenge on the enemy for violations of their personal and family 
honour. Now, the Balkans come to substitute human qualities like 
love for freedom, proud and indomitable “spirit”, and the force to
55 The examples for this exposition come mainly from works of fiction and 
literary essays.
56 The geo-political significance of the Balkans in the Bulgarian history is 
analysed by MUTAFCHIEV, P. “Balkanut v nashata istoriia”, in: Mutafchiev, 
P. Kniga za bulgarite. Sofia, 1987, 65-89. He presents the thesis (p. 66) that 
neither the old Bulgarian kingdom nor its ethnic potential could have 
survived without the Balkans, because of the unfavourable “crossroad” 
situation.
57 The image of the Balkans appears in Pencho Slaveikov’s poems: “Na 
Balkana” in: SLAVEIKOV, P. Epicheski pesni. Sofia, 1928, 124-128 and 
especially in his epic poem “Kurvava pesen" - SLAVEIKOV, P. Kurvava pesen. 
Sofia. 1931, esp. 5-8, 45-50, 283-193. The Balkans are presented here as a 
powerful and frowning old warrior watching from a distance and from above 
the historical events that take place on the plains. From an indifferent 
observer at the beginning this “personality” develops into an active 
participant in the historical drama on the side of “his” people - the 
Bulgarians. One may also point to the essayist reflections by the same 
author, where the Balkans are “generalised" into a designation for all 
Bulgarian mountains: SLAVEIKOV, P. “Bulgarskata narodna pesen", in: 





























































































resist.58 It is thus that they become an “expression” of Bulgarian - 
ness. Bulgarianness does not mean here a simple aggregate of the 
people and their customs, their history and mentalities but rather a 
quasi metaphysical entity - a “spirit” or quintessential “idea” o f the 
nation. The established relationship goes in both directions - from 
human to nature and from nature to human. The power and the 
forces attributed to the Balkans because of their size are projected 
back onto the Bulgarian nation. The “rapprochement” effected 
between Nature and Culture, Geography and Ethnicity creates a 
powerful national symbol, invested with a strong affectivity.59
The poetic imagination populates the Balkans with “supernatural" 
creatures, taken from pagan beliefs or from a sort of paganised 
popular Christianity and invests them with magic potencies.60 The 
mountains are thus expanded and “generalised” into a cosmic 
category. A nation that is destined to inhabit a cosmically significant 
space (or to come in contact with it in the decisive moments of its 
historical existence) is sure to partake of its cosmic greatness too. The 
geographical topos is first exalted, then projected onto the nation, to 
enhance its dignity and grandeur.
Though most prominent, the Balkans are not the only geographical 
topos charged with a national meaning. The whole territory of a nation 
is in a way sacred, and it is strewn with cultural signs. History has 
left its traces everywhere. There are legends and stories about a
58 For example in the essay of GULUBOV, K. “Chovekut na kavala, chovekut 
na ribniia bukvar, chovekut na Balkana”, in: Gulubov, K. Zovut na rodinata 
(Kultumilat put na bulgarina. Literatumi opiti.) Sofia, 1930, 7-10. The “man of 
the Balkans” is a metaphor for the politically active Bulgarian who loves his 
freedom and is ready to fight for it; this also stands for the active “aspect” of 
the national character.
59 A similar observation about turning natural features of the homeland 
into historical ones (thus humanising and historicising them) and about the 
reverse process of naturalising historical monuments in "cultivating poetic 
spaces” as a means of forming the nation, may be found in SMITH, A. 
National Identity, 64-66, 127-128.
69 Examples may be found in the poetry of the great Bulgarian poet and 
revolutionary of the national Revival epoch Hristo Botev: his poem “Hadzhi 
Dimitur” which depicts the heroic death of another Bulgarian national 
revolutionary, surrounded by supernatural beings on a Balkan mountain 
top. One may also mention Naiden Sheitanov’s pantheist fantasies on the 
theme of “Balkan magic” - SHEITANOV, N. “Zmeiat”, ZLatorog, 4, 8 (1923), 





























































































number of places: mountain tops, rivers, ravines, rocks, etc. In a 
nation-bound interpretation the local “signifiers” are infused with a 
"wider” national meaning, they come to signify the nation’s past and 
its “destinies". This interpretative task is accomplished in “local 
historiography", promoted by historians and museum workers, 
sometimes by school teachers and amateur patriots.
Besides “nature”, persons may also embody national meanings and 
serve the purposes of self-identification. Historical personalities 
exemplify the best national qualities, the very “spirit” of the nation, 
and provide paradigms of behaviour. As already mentioned, Bulgarian 
national heroes and saints are taken mainly from the Revival period. 
These are usually officially consecrated and sanctified figures, evoked 
on state and military celebrations. Leaving aside straightforward self- 
identification with heroes (and the question of to what extent it really 
takes place) I would like to consider an example of a literary 
personage that had the extraordinary career of becoming a kind of 
national symbol in the “popular representations”, to the detriment of 
the official exegesis.
“Bai Ganyo” (the novel bears the name of the hero) was created at the 
beginning of the century by the famous Bulgarian writer, author of 
travel descriptions and political pamphlets, Aleko Konstantinov, with 
the intention of satirising the cultural and political life in Bulgaria at 
the time. The novel is, in fact, composed of a number of almost 
independent chapters, with hardly any continuity apart from the main 
protagonist; the protagonist himself is more of a collection of different 
traits and characteristics, displayed in various situations, than a 
consistent figure.61 Bai Ganyo is a petty trader of rose oil, travelling 
throughout Europe, shocking “civilised” people with his manners, 
always suspicious of others and looking for ways to use them and
61 It seems that Aleko Konstantinov was mostly interested in exploiting for 
satirical purposes situations (scenes from the Bulgarian social and political 
life, travels of the hero to Europe for trade, etc.) and was little concerned 
with the consistency and psychological unity of his hero. What we thus have 
is a number of situations with few connections between them and a rather 
heterogeneous protagonist, displaying different traits in various 
circumstances. While there is little "personalisation” of the protagonist in 
the sense of deepening into his psychological experiences, a colourful 





























































































take advantages for himself (while not really a “humbug”); inside 
Bulgaria he is a partisan of the political party in office, one of those 
that spoil the atmosphere of the political life - in a word, a negative 
hero. It is the more surprising that precisely this hero should become 
a standard national reference.62
The popularity of Bai Ganyo may, in my view, be explained by the 
various possibilities of identification and by the actuality of some of 
the situations described for the present-day Bulgarian. Some ways of 
identification are direct and simple, others indirect and ambivalent. 
One may call a particular compatriot “a ganyo” with the intention of 
offending, the connotations being that he is either “uncivilised”, 
rough, “uncultured” (in a strongly evaluative sense) or unscrupulous 
and taking advantage of others. It should be noted that while the 
speaker is aware of a national connotation in the abuse, he is often 
excluding himself from the proposed identity. But then a positive 
reinterpretation of the qualities associated with the hero may be 
effected, most often in low-class, poorly educated layers.63 “Ganyo” 
may refer in a wider sense to the national mentality, and statements 
like “we are ganyos” can be pronounced in self-depreciation or with a 
resignation. A challenging use is also possible: be a “Ganyo”, well, why 
not; one has to take care of his own interests in the first place. Next, a 
person may call himself “a Ganyo” with a kind of self-irony, e. g. as an 
excuse for being too insistent and somewhat insolent - in fact this
62 The issue of what Bai Ganyo stands for has been vigorously debated by 
Bulgarian literary critics. Two main view points emerged. While Marxist 
literary criticism insisted on the "social conditioning” of the protagonist and 
on his historical "determination”, presenting him namely as a "bourgeois” 
figure of the rough times of "initial accumulation” of capital, other literary 
historians and critics (Boian Penev in the first place) saw him as an 
"Oriental man in general", as standing for “uncivilised" (uncultured) persons 
altogether, independently of any national qualities. See: PENEV, B. 
“Prevuplushteniiata na Bai Ganyo", ZLatorog, 4, 1 (1923), 22-33, esp. 26 and 
29. No one defended in that dispute the view that Bai Ganyo stands for “the 
Bulgarian" and the whole learned dispute arose precisely to oppose and 
refute the national identification of the hero and the self-identification with 
him among the broader public.
63 Boian Penev regrets the fact that against the critical intention of the 
author, Bai Ganyo was reinterpreted in a positive way by many people, 
especially among the poorly educated and the soldiers during World War I, 
namely as an expression of what is valuable and worthy of admiration in the 
Bulgarian character: common sense and pragmatism, toughness and other 
military virtues; the oeuvre was read as “a novel of adventures, narrating the 
courageous adventures of a new hero”. See PENEV, B. “Prevuplushteniiata 




























































































may be a way of denying any resemblance with the hero. Self-irony 
introduces distance, complexity and ambivalence in the reference. 
What I would like to suggest here is that a nationally meaningful 
“symbol” may be referred to in various ways, other than a positive 
self-identification. Identification may evoke pride as well as shame, 
and there are also ambiguous modalities of experiencing nationhood.
The way Bai Ganyo refers the Bulgarian nation to European 
civilisation deserves a special mention.64 Superficially Europeanised 
and distortedly “civilised”, shocking people with his behaviour while - 
it should be noted - acting quite consistently according to his own 
cultural assumptions and to his own purposes, the authentic hero 
meets Europe without a feeling of shame or an inferiority complex; he 
is in this sense quite “natural”.65 Now, it is the still uneasy attitude 
towards Europe that makes Bulgarians compare themselves - 
individually and as a nation - to this so deficiently “Europeanised” 
prototype. There is always the question how far away “we” - present- 
day Bulgarians - have travelled from that hero-compatriot; this 
sensitivity reveals a kind of inferiority complex as regards (Western) 
Europe. Ganyo is thus transformed into an inner measure for 
“Europeanisation” (and for being “civilised” in general) and there is a 
certain irony in the fact that it is precisely the advance in civility 
which makes the experience of inferiority possible. Always on the road 
to Europe and modernity Bulgarians feel themselves to be in the 
awkward position of following in Bai Ganyo’s steps; it is precisely this 
hero that came to express and dramatise the ambiguous situation of 
belated and deficient modernisation and (here synonymous with this) 
“Europeanisation” of the Bulgarian nation.
* * *
So far 1 have been dealing with the different materials used in 
identity-building. But the construction of the national identity also 
proceeds by differentiation, demarcation, even negation and 
repudiation both on a symbolic level and in the real dynamics of
The literary historian Nikola Georgiev proposed recently the 
interpretation of Bai Ganyo as a kind of cultural mediator between Bulgaria 
and Europe - semi-Oriental, semi-European in both oudook and mentality. 
65 Probably it has been Aleko's intention to convey a sense of shame to the 
more sensitive readers in depicting the "uncivilised” behaviour of the hero, 




























































































group formation. The notion of “we" presupposes “them”; what is 
more, “we" are “we” often only against “them”, the constitution of the 
self then taking the form of repulsion of the “Other”.66 The 
differentiation and distancing from the “Other” may become attached 
to various criteria.67 I will consider this “negative” work of constitution 
through differentiation for the case of Bulgaria.
The identification as Bulgarians under the Ottoman domination had 
to assume different "markers”, depending on who was to be repelled. 
Thus orthodoxy and language served as divides from the politically 
dominant Muslims. But the attempts at ethnic assimilation by the 
orthodox Greeks, further ahead on the road to nationalism at the time 
when it was making its first converts among the Bulgarians, called for 
other ways of differentiation: the establishment o f an independent 
national Church and the elimination of the Greek language from 
Church officiating and from school teaching. The Slav identification 
has, on certain occasions, been of advantage for the Bulgarians, e.g. 
in the early ideas of South-Slav co-operation (“Illirism”) or when the 
expectations for national liberation were turned to Russia. In other 
cases the Slav identity was felt as a threat: thus late pan-Slavism had 
to be rejected as an instrument of Russian imperialist ambitions. And 
neither the Slav identity, nor Orthodoxy (nor language for that matter) 
could serve as a divide from the Serbs: in this case only history could 
provide ways of demarcation and it is hardly surprising that the
66 in the distancing from the “Other” different forces may be at work: class 
interest, foreign rule, ideology. At a deeper level “othering” seems to result 
from a deeply felt need in constituting ourselves; it is thus produced even 
without power asymmetries. See JOHNSON, R. "Towards a Cultural Theory of 
the Nation: A British-Dutch Dialogue", 200- 204; For the Orient as an 
“internal Other" to the West, and the largely imaginative nature of this Other 
(“imaginative geography”, “imaginative history" of the Orient) see SAID, E. 
Orientalism. London and Henley: Harmondsworth, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1978, 2, 12, 21-22, 54-55.
67 That is why closure into nations seems arbitrary; for the same reason 
exclusive dependence on “objective" criteria in defining a nation is never 
sufficient and has to be supplemented by "subjective” criteria (self- 
perception, “consciousness", will). What is more, differences have to be “felt” 
("perceived") in order to become “objective”. See the treatment of ethnic 
categories in WEBER, M. Wirtshaft und GesellshafL Tubingen, 1980, 234- 
244; For an exposition of the two main approaches in defining a nation - 
“objectivist” (based on "culture”) and "subjectivist” (or “voluntarist", based on 
will) see GELLNER, E. Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1983, 7, 53-58. See also the treatment of the concept o f nation by 
HOBSBAWM, E. Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Cambridge: Cambridge 




























































































historical “debate” between Bulgarian and Serb historians has been 
most animated and heavily politicised.
From the fifteenth century onwards two quite dramatic forms of 
“Otherness”, that is, of other culture and civilisation, played a role for 
the Bulgarians - the Oriental (Ottoman) and the (West) European. The 
Ottoman “Other” was immediately present as a foreign ruler and since 
the advance of the national processes in the nineteenth century it 
called forth a reaction of total rejection.68 At the same time a deep and 
enduring influence was exercised by the Turkish-Oriental culture on 
Bulgarian culture, especially in the field of domestic life, in tastes and 
mental attitudes, etc. In spite of the militant rejection in the political 
dimension, the “Other" was thus partly internalised.
Many Turks remained in Bulgaria after the liberation in 1877 in the 
position of a “minority”, but lived in a comparatively tolerant 
atmosphere. Then, more than a century later, in 1984 Zhivkov's 
regime in Bulgaria started for some reason an unprecedented 
campaign for driving part of this minority out of the country. There 
was in the media a propaganda of “historical knowledge”, latent 
nationalist feelings were activated and fervent nationalists mobilised 
in “othering" and stigmatising the Turkish minority. Being ethnically 
Turkish (and Muslim) seemed once again incompatible with being 
Bulgarian by nationality and citizenship. The regime was able to force 
a re-christening (re-naming) of the Turks with Bulgarian names and 
to suppress their religious and cultural practices, but the minority 
was strongly alienated and with lasting consequences. 
Postcommunism brought the ethnic issue to the political arena again. 
Organised in a party of its own and manoeuvring between the main 
political opponents the Turkish minority succeeded in gaining 
minority rights.69 It seems that the country’s future will depend to a 
large extent on the success in developing and sustaining a broader 
(territorial, civic-political) Bulgarian national identity, capable of
68 On this influence see: GENCHEV, N. Bulgarskata kultura XV-XIX v. Sofia: 
Sofia University Press, 1988, 99-101, 273.
This party entered Parliament in the first and the second elections after 
communism and has been playing the role of a balance between the 
Socialist (former Communist) party and its opponents; it led to a fall of the 





























































































tolerating differences and of transcending particular ethno-cultural 
identities.70
“Europe” acted on Bulgaria from a distance with all the attractions of 
modernity: technical and scientific achievements, progressive ideas 
and values, prestigious styles of life and consumption, etc. Europe 
stood for civilisation as such and for “progress”, so that positive 
attitudes towards it could have the flavour of universalism and 
cosmopolitanism. Besides, the European West, even in its colonial 
and semi-colonial expansionism, did not threaten ethnic assimilation. 
No wonder that along with the development of the national processes 
and after the establishment of the new Bulgarian state, there was a 
growing aspiration to appropriate and incorporate European 
achievements and values. Yet the relation to Europe or to what 
functioned as “images” of Europe was not exempt from tensions and 
ambiguities. There was first (and quite early) the apprehension that 
the European influence is ruinous for the traditional culture and 
morals and that it somehow conflicts with the consolidation of a 
national “consciousness”71; there were then concerns of how to 
develop the national culture with some creativity and originality while 
absorbing influences from the culturally powerful European nations; 
there were also fears that the “Europeanised” intelligentsia is growing 
apart from the mass of the “people” and giving up the national 
ideals.72 Finally, the belated, uneven and not quite successful 
modernisation with all its reverse sides and drawbacks engendered 
uneasiness and frustrations. While this created a certain nostalgia for 
the past and some militant nationalism, a radically anti-European 
ideological trend or social movement was lacking in Bulgaria. After 
communism more than ever, because of the expectations for 
assistance from Europe and the wish to be “integrated” in it, a
7<-* Holding a passport is not equivalent to national identity, as one may not 
identify himself with his official citizenship.
71 VOINIKOV, D. "Predgovor" in: Voinikov, D. Krivorazbranata tsivilisatsiia. 
Bukurest, 1871, I-III; “Dluzhnostta i grazhdaninut”, Chitalishte, 3, 3 (1872), 
335-336.
72 PETKANOV, K. “Bulgarskata inteligentsiia kato rozhba i otritsanie na 
nasheto selo", Filosofski pregled, 4, 2 (1932), 124-135; ILIEV, A. 
“Inteligentsia i narod”, Prosveta, 7, 8-10 (1942), 861-870; ILIEV, A. 
“Narodnostnoto obosobiavane na bulgarskata kultura", Bulgarska misid, 11, 




























































































national identity and a feeling of belonging to Europe - whatever that 
may mean - seem to be experienced as easily compatible.
The national identity is in a sense a freely constructed representation; 
nations are “imagined communities”, in the apt phrase of B. 
Anderson.73 Speaking about “self-knowledge” and “self-discovery” 
people are constantly creating and recreating their ethnic identities. 
While ethnic identities are perceived, believed, imagined or even 
wished for entities, they are nonetheless “real”. They are real in the 
sense of being deeply rooted in experience and in being able to exert 
palpable effects upon reality, constituting thus part of it. In another 
language we may speak of a “dialectical” relationship between those 
poles. There is in identity building also the relationship between past 
and present notions. Materials used in the process of imagining the 
national identity are supplied from the past, transmitted across time 
as “traditions”. But tradition itself - whether historical memories or 
whatever else - is always interpreted, invented and reinvented.74 The 
ethnocultural identities are ongoing processes.
National identity is but one of the identities of modem man. There are 
other kinds of identities: regional, professional, religious, class, 
gender, kinship, age and generation identities.75 The prevalence of 
certain types of identities (professional, class and national in 
particular) over the “primordial” kinship identities and over religious 
identities seems to be a distinctive sign of modernity.76 Looking at 
how many people have died for their nation and that such death is 
experienced as meaningful, one may assert that the national 
identification (and loyalty) has absorbed some of the power of the 
primordial identifications and loyalties. At the same time conflicts 
between the various identities (and the corresponding loyalties) seem 
to be less dramatic nowadays than in the past, and the different
73 ANDERSON, B. Imagined Communities, 15-16. As Anderson notes, to say 
that communities - national but also others - are “imagined” (“invented” or 
created) does not mean that they are for that reason "fabricated” or "false".
74 HOBSBAWM, E. (ed.) The Invention o f Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983.
73 On the multiple identities see for example SMITH, A. National Identity, 3-
8.
7® The upsurge of religious fundamentalism is, however, a recent trend that 




























































































Identities have become more compatible. There is from the perspective 
of the individual the possibility to shift from one identity to another, 
depending on the circumstances and in what capacity one is called 
forth.77 There is, furthermore, a certain "latitude” within each of the 
identities for the individual to construct his own version of identity. 
Generally speaking, these possibilities attest to a growth of individual 
autonomy and freedom. There are, however, situations when one is 
forced into an identity, whether in willed self-defence, or as a result of 
a “definition” imposed on him from the outside. Hard times (of crisis) 
for a given society are encouraging the search for ethnic identities to 
serve as a kind of spiritual support. Discrimination along ethnic and 
national lines forces a minority into a compensatory identity 
bu ild ing.78 Migration and living abroad are among the special 
circumstances that intensify the individual experience of national 
identities. There is also the “strategic" use of identity in the struggle 
for certain advantages. From this point of view, national identities 
appear as an example of the “classification struggles” (for an 
usurpation or imposition of a certain “category”) and are part of the 
power struggles between groups.
77 An example is provided by HOBSBAWM, E. Nations and Nationalism since 
1780, 8.
7® Thus R. Johnson notes the stronger need for identity in the face of 
"national” misrecognition, sometimes resulting in challenging inversions of 
the dominant evaluations (“black nation", “queer nation” in the U.S.A.) - 
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